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ABSTRACT 
Even before 9/11 there were claims that the nature of war had changed 
fundamentally1.  The 9/11 attacks created an urgent need to understand 
contemporary wars and their relationship to older conventional and terrorist wars, 
both of which exhibit remarkable regularities2-6.  The frequency-intensity distribution 
of fatalities in "old wars", 1816-1980, is a power-law with exponent 1.80(9)2.i  Global 
terrorist attacks, 1968-present, also follow a power-law with exponent 1.71(3) for G7 
countries and 2.5(1) for non-G7 countries5. Here we analyze two ongoing, high-profile 
wars on opposite sides of the globe - Colombia and Iraq.  Our analysis uses our own 
unique dataset for killings and injuries in Colombia, plus publicly available data for 
civilians killed in Iraq.  We show strong evidence for power-law behavior within each 
war.  Despite substantial differences in contexts and data coverage, the power-law 
coefficients for both wars are tending toward 2.5, which is a value characteristic of 
non-G7 terrorism as opposed to old wars.  We propose a plausible yet analytically-
solvable model of modern insurgent warfare, which can explain these observations. 
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i Numbers in parentheses give the standard error on the trailing figure in each case. 
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In two celebrated papers3,4 Lewis Richardson showed that war casualties follow a 
power law distribution, i.e. the probability that a given war has x  victims, ( )xp , is equal to 
α−Cx  over a reasonably wide range of x , with C  and α  positive coefficients. This in turn 
implies that a graph of ( )[ ]xXP ≥log   vs. ( )xlog  will be a straight line over this range of 
x , with negative slope 1−α .ii  These results were updated recently6 to show that interstate 
wars, 1820-1997, obey a power law.  Each data point is a casualty count for an entire war in 
these studies.  Casualty numbers in global terrorist events, 1968 to present, also obey power 
laws where in this case each data point is a terrorist attack5.  
While many people believe that 9/11 fundamentally changed the nature of warfare, 
some analysts had discerned new wars emerging even before this disaster1.  Thomas 
Hammes views “fourth generation wars”, as trenchantly exposited by Mao Tse-tung, as the 
prevalent form of contemporary warfare7,8.  These are conflicts in which incumbents with 
overwhelming military and economic superiority face extremely patient insurgents seeking 
to break their enemies’ political will through persistent and demoralizing attacks.  The 
phenomenon covers numerous well-known cases including Viet Nam, Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Israel-Palestine and Al-Qaeda7.  Thus, fourth generation warfare encompasses both global 
terrorism5 plus a variety of civil and/or international wars as commonly understood. 
Here our contribution is threefold.  First, we analyze detailed daily data for two 
specific ongoing wars in Colombia and Iraq and find that both obey power laws.  Thus, we 
extend Richardson’s fundamental insight into the micro world of single conflicts.  Second, 
we show that the power-law coefficients for both wars are drifting strikingly close to the 
global terrorism coefficient for non-G7 countries5. Thus, at least these two examples of 
                                                 
ii We will refer to ( )xXP ≥  as the cumulative distribution obtained from ( )xp . 
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modern warfare increasingly resemble both each other and global terrorism in non-G7 
countries.  This finding resonates strongly with the notion of the rise of fourth generation 
warfare7.  Third we propose a micro conflict model that can explain our results.  
Figure 1 shows log-log plots of the fraction of all recorded events for that particular 
war with x  or more victims, ( )xXP ≥ , versus x .  For Colombia we are able to work with 
the very broad measure of all conflict-related killings plus injuries.  For the Iraq data we 
work with killings of civilians as provided by the Iraq Body Count Project.  The straight 
lines over long ranges in Figure 1 suggest that both these wars follow power laws.  The 
Colombia data displays an extraordinary fit for a social science application while the Iraq 
data also fits well except for a bulge in the 150 to 350 range.  Since we have many more 
Colombia events than Iraq ones, the superiority of the Colombia curve is not surprising.  
Nevertheless, the rest of the Iraq curve fits well enough so as to suggest that we should 
expect more events in the 150-200 range in the future. (The inset to Figure 1 shows a 
shortage of events in the 150-200 range. The cumulative distribution therefore exhibits a 
bulge, which eventually disappears around 350). 
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Figure 1  Log-log plots of cumulative distributions )( xXP ≥  describing the 
total number of events with severity greater than x , for the ongoing wars in 
Iraq (red) and Colombia (blue).  For Iraq, the severity is taken to be the lower 
estimate of civilian deaths from www.iraqbodycount.com.  For Colombia, the 
severity is taken to be the total number of deaths plus injuries from the 
CERAC dataset9.  Each line indicates the most likely power law that fits the 
data (see text).  The inset shows a histogram of the Iraq data set and points 
to a shortage of attacks with severity in the range 150-200; this shortage 
creates the bulge in the Iraq line in the main figure.  
Using well-established methods2, as explained in the Methods and Supplementary 
Information sections, we have verified that each cumulative distribution in Figure 1 
satisfies a power-law relationship over a very wide range. We also find robust power-law 
behavior for data collected over smaller time-windows, as discussed below, and have hence 
deduced the evolution of the power-law coefficient α  over time by sliding this time-
window through the data-series. Figure 2 shows these empirically-determined α  values as 
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a function of time for both conflicts.  The α  values in both cases are tending toward 2.5, 
which is the coefficient for global terrorism in non-G7 countries. The implication is that 
both these wars and global non-G7 terrorism are beginning to share a similar underlying 
structure. This finding is consistent with the idea of the increasing prevalence of fourth 
generation warfare7. The Methods and Supplementary Information sections provide details 
of the tests we performed to verify the robustness of our results. 
 
Figure 2  The variation through time of the power law coefficient α  for Iraq 
(red) and Colombia (blue).  The straight lines are fits through these points, 
and suggest a common value of approximately 2.5 for both wars in the near 
future. The values for G7 and non-G7 terrorism are also shown5. See text for 
details of how the variation through time of α  is calculated.  
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There is a need for a model which can explain this common value of α ≈ 2.5.  
Standard physical mechanisms for generating power laws make little sense in the context of 
Colombia or Iraq2.  One might instead guess that casualties would arise in rough proportion 
to the population sizes of the places where insurgent groups attack: given that city 
populations may follow a power law2, it is conceivable that this would also produce power 
laws for the severity of attacks.  However, we have tested this hypothesis against our 
Colombia data and it is resoundingly rejected.   
Instead, we have developed a new model of modern insurgent warfare. As shown in 
Figure 3, and explained in detail in the Supplementary Information section, our model 
assumes that the insurgent force operates as a collection of fairly self-contained units, 
which we call 'attack units'. Each attack unit has a particular 'attack strength' characterizing 
the average number of casualties arising in an event involving this attack unit. As time 
evolves, these attack units either join forces with other attack units (i.e. coalescence) or 
break up (i.e. fragmentation). Eventually this on-going process of coalescence and 
fragmentation reaches a dynamical steady-state which is solvable analytically, yielding 
5.2=α . This value is in remarkable agreement with the α  values to which both Colombia 
and Iraq appear to be tending (recall Figure 2). It also suggests that similar distributions of 
attack units might be emerging in both Colombia and Iraq, with each attack unit in an 
ongoing state of coalescence and fragmentation. Our model also offers the following 
interpretation for the dynamical evolution of α  observed in Figure 2. The Iraq war began 
as a conventional confrontation between large armies, but continuous pressure applied to 
the Iraqis by coalition forces has fragmented the insurgency into a structure in which 
smaller attack units, characteristic of non-G7 global terrorism, now predominate.  In 
Colombia, on the other hand, the guerrillas in the early 1990’s had even less ability than 
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global terrorists to coalesce into high-impact units but have gradually been acquiring 
comparable capabilities. 
Figure 3  Our analytically-solvable model describing modern insurgent 
warfare. The insurgent force comprises attack units, each of which has a 
particular attack strength. The total attack strength of the insurgent force is 
being continually re-distributed through a process of coalescence and 
fragmentation.  Mathematical details are provided in the Supplementary 
Information section. 
 
More generally, our results – combined with those of Clauset and Young, and 
Richardson – suggest that there are power laws between wars, power laws for global 
terrorism and power laws within contemporary wars. That is, power laws have an 
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extraordinary range of applicability to human conflict, both on the large and the small 
scale. In addition, our finding that the statistical patterns of the intra-war events in 
Colombia and Iraq appear to be trending toward the same value as global terrorist incidents 
in non-G7 countries (i.e. 5.2=α ) suggests that such global terrorist incidents can 
themselves be viewed as intra-war events within some larger, on-going yet ill-defined 
“global war”.  This leaves open the possibility that the spatio-temporal correlations between 
events within a particular war, are related to those at play in global terrorism. We leave this 
intriguing discussion to a later publication. 
 
Methods 
Data Sources 
We make extensive use of our own CERAC dataset for Colombia9 plus publicly available 
data on Iraq (www.iraqbodycount.org).  The CERAC data builds on primary source 
compilations of violent events by Colombian human rights NGO’s and from local and 
national press reports.  We distil from this foundation all the clear conflict events, i.e., those 
that have a military effect and reflect the actions of a group participating in the armed 
conflict.  For each event we record the participating groups, the type of event (massacre, 
bombing, clash, etc.), the location, the methods used and the number of killings and injuries 
of people in various categories (guerrillas, civilians, etc.).  This data set covers the years 
1988-2004 and includes 20,251 events. The Iraq Body Count Project monitors the reporting 
of more than 30 respected online news sources, recording only events reported by at least 
two of them.  For each event they log the date, time, location, target, weapon, estimates of 
the minimum and maximum number of civilian deaths and the sources of the information.  
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The concept of civilian is broad, including, for example, policemen.  The list of events, 
posted online, covers the full range of war activity, including suicide bombings, roadside 
bombings, US air strikes, car bombs, artillery strikes and individual assassinations.  The 
data set covers the period from 2003 to the present and includes 1,746 events. 
Power Law Calculation 
First we used a Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit test to select minx , the smallest value 
for which the power law is thought to hold.  The formula α =1+ n ln xi xmin( )
i=1
n∑⎡ ⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
−1
 then 
estimates the power-law exponent while jackknife resampling estimates the error in α . To 
check these results, we then estimated α  using least-square regression on the observations 
above minx .  For both the Iraq and the Colombia data we obtained nearly identical point 
estimates of very high significance, with nearly null p-values using White-
heteroskedasticity-corrected robust standard errors.  We then performed robustness checks 
by excluding outliers and high-leverage observations from the regressions, finding only 
marginal changes in parameter estimates. 
Variation through time of α  
We apply the above procedures by varying minx  for each estimate and also by using a fixed 
minx  for all the estimates, and find no significant differences.  The Colombian coefficients 
are calculated for two-year intervals displaced every 50 days.  The Iraq coefficients are 
calculated for one-year intervals displaced every 30 days.  The differences in calculation 
procedures were necessitated by the relatively shorter run of the Iraq data compared to the 
Colombia data. 
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Supplementary Information 
PART 1:    Detailed discussion of the model introduced in the paper 
Here we provide details of the model of modern insurgent warfare, which we introduced in 
the main paper. Our goal is to provide a plausible model to explain (i) why power-law 
behaviour is observed in the Colombia and Iraq wars, and (ii) why the power-law 
coefficients for the Colombia and Iraq wars should both be heading toward a value of 2.5. 
In other words, why should a modern war such as that currently underway in Colombia 
or Iraq, produce power-law behaviour and why should the value of 2.5 emerge as a 
power-law coefficient? 
Our model bears some similarity to a model of herding by Cont and Bouchaudiii, and 
is a direct adaptation of the Eguiluz-Zimmerman model of herding in financial marketsiv. 
The analytical derivation which we present, is an adaptation of earlier formalism laid out by 
D’Hulst and Rodgersv, and also draws heavily on the material in the book Financial Market 
Complexity by Neil F. Johnson, Paul Jefferies and Pak Ming Hui (Oxford University Press, 
2003). One of us (NFJ) is extremely grateful to Pak Ming Hui for detailed correspondence 
about the Eguiluz-Zimmerman model of financial markets, the associated formalism, and 
its extensions – and also for discussions involving the present model.  
As suggested by Figure 3 in the paper, our model is based on the plausible notion that 
the total attack capability of an insurgent force in ‘fourth-generation’ warfare, is being 
                                                 
iii R. Cont and J.P. Bouchaud, Macroeconomic Dynamics 4, 170 (2000) 
iv V.M. Eguiluz and M.G. Zimmerman, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 5659 (2000) 
v R. D’Hulst and G.J. Rodgers, Eur. Phys. J. B 20, 619 (2001). See also Y. Xie, B.H. Wang, H. Quan, W. 
Yang and P.M. Hui, Phys. Rev. E 65, 046130 (2002). 
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continually re-distributed. Based on our intuition about such guerilla-like wars, we consider 
the insurgent force to be made up of attack units or cells which have certain attack 
strength (see below for a detailed discussion). One might expect that the total attack 
strength for the entire insurgent force would change slowly over time.  At any particular 
instant, this total attack strength is distributed (i.e. partitioned) among the various attack 
units -- moreover the composition of these attack units, and hence their relative attack 
strengths, will evolve in time as a result of an on-going process of coalescence (i.e. 
combination of attack units) and fragmentation (i.e. breaking up of attack units). Such a 
process of coalescence and fragmentation is realistic for an insurgent force in a guerilla-like 
war, and will be driven by a combination of planned decisions and opportunistic actions by 
both the insurgent force and the incumbent force. For example, separate attack units might 
coalesce prior to an attack, or an individual attack unit might fragment in response to a 
crackdown by the incumbent force. Here we will model this process of coalescence and 
fragmentation as a stochastic process.  
 
Each attack unit carries a specific label  i, j,k,K and has an attack strength denoted by 
  si,s j ,sk,K respectively. We start by discussing what we mean by these definitions: 
attack unit or cell: Here we have in mind a group of people, weapons, explosives, 
machines, or even information, which organizes itself to act as a single unit. In the case of 
people, this means that they are probably connected by location (e.g. they are physically 
together) or connected by some form of communications systems. In the case of a piece of 
equipment, this means that it is readily available for use by members of a particular group. 
The simplest scenario is to just consider people, and in particular a group of insurgents 
which are in such frequent contact that they are able to act as a single group. However we 
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emphasize that an attack unit may also consist of a combination of people and objects – for 
example, explosives plus a few people, such as the case of suicide bombers. Such an attack 
unit, while only containing a few people, could have a high attack strength. In addition, 
information could also be a valuable part of an attack unit. For example, a lone suicide 
bomber who knows when a certain place will be densely populated (e.g. a military canteen 
at lunchtimes) and who knows how to get into such a place unnoticed, will also represent 
an attack unit with a high attack strength. 
attack strength: We define the attack strength si of a given attack unit i , as the average 
number of people who are typically injured or killed as the result of an event involving 
attack unit i . In other words, a typical event (e.g. attack or clash) involving group i  will 
lead to the injury or death of si people. This definition covers both the case of one-sided 
attacks by attack unit i  (since in this case, all casualties are due to the presence of attack 
unit i) and it also covers two-sided clashes (since presumably there would have been no 
clash, and hence no casualties, if unit i  had not been present). 
We take the sum of the attack strengths over all the attack units (i.e. the total attack 
strength of the insurgent force) to be equal to N . From the definition of attack strength, it 
follows that N  represents the maximum number of people which would be injured or killed 
in an event, on average, if the entire insurgent force were to act together as a single attack 
unit. Mathematically, si
i, j ,k,K
∑ = N . For any significant insurgent force, one would expect 
N >>1. The power-law results that we will derive do not depend on any particular choice 
of N . In particular, the power-law result which is derived in this Supplementary 
Information section concerning the average number ns of attack units having a given attack 
strength s, is invariant under a global magnification of scale (as are all power-laws).  
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The model therefore becomes, in mathematical terms, one in which this total attack 
strength N  is dynamically distributed among attack groups as a result of an ongoing 
process of coalescence and fragmentation. As a further clarification of our terminology, we 
will now discuss the two limiting cases which we classify as the ‘coalescence’ and 
‘fragmentation’ limits for convenience: 
• ‘Coalescence’ limit: Suppose the conflict is such that all the attack units join 
together or coalesce into a single large attack unit. This is the limit of 
complete coalescence and would correspond to amassing all the available 
combatants and weaponry in a single place – very much like the armies of the 
past would amass their entire force on the field of battle. Hence there is one 
large attack unit, which we label as i  and which has an attack strength N . All 
other attack units disappear. Hence si → N . This ‘coalescence’ limit has the 
minimum possible number of attack units (i.e. one) but the maximum possible 
attack strength (i.e. N ) in that attack unit. 
• ‘Fragmentation’ limit: Suppose the conflict is such that all the attack units 
fragment into ever smaller attack units. Eventually we will have all attack 
units having attack strength equal to one. Hence si →1 for all   i =1,2,K,N . 
This would correspond to all combatants operating essentially individually. 
This ‘fragmentation’ limit has the maximum possible number of attack units 
(i.e. N ) but the minimum possible attack strength per attack unit (i.e. one). 
 In practice, of course, one would expect the situation to lie between these two limits. 
Indeed, it seems reasonable to expect that these attack units and their respective attack 
strengths, will evolve in time within a given war. Indeed, one can envisage that these attack 
units will occasionally either break up into smaller groups (i.e. smaller attack units) or join 
15 
 15
together to form larger ones. The reasons are plentiful why this should occur: for example, 
the opposing forces (e.g. the Colombian Army in Colombia, or Coalition Forces in Iraq) 
may be applying pressure in terms of searching for hidden insurgent groups. Hence these 
insurgent groups (i.e. attack units) might either decide, or be forced, to break up in order to 
move more quickly, or in order to lose themselves in the towns or countryside.  
Hence attack units with different attack strengths will continually mutate via 
coalescence and fragmentation yielding a ‘soup’ of attack units with a range of attack 
strengths. At any one moment in time, this ‘soup’ corresponds mathematically to 
partitioning the total N  units of attack strength which the insurgent army possesses. The 
analysis which we now present suggests that the current states of the guerilla/insurgency 
wars in Colombia and Iraq both correspond to the steady-state limit of such an on-going 
coalescence-fragmentation process. It also suggests that such a process might also underpin 
the acts of terrorism in non-G7 countries, and that such terrorism is characteristic of some 
longer-term ‘global war’.  
Against the backdrop of on-going fragmentation and coalescence of attack units, we 
suppose that each attack unit has a given probability p  of being involved in an event in a 
given time-interval, regardless of its attack strength. For example, p could represent the 
probability that an arbitrarily chosen attack unit comes across an undefended target – or 
vice versa, the probability that an arbitrarily chosen attack unit finds itself under attack. In 
these instances, p should be relatively insensitive to the actual attack strength of the attack 
unit involved: hence the results which we shall derive for the distribution of attack 
strengths, should also be applicable to the distribution of events having a given severity. 
When obtaining our analytic and numerical results, we assume that the war has been 
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underway for a long time and hence some kind of steady-state has been reached. This latter 
assumption is again plausible for the wars in Colombia and Iraq. 
Given the above considerations, it follows that if there are, on average, ns attack units 
of a given attack strength s, then the average number of events involving an attack unit of 
attack strength s will be proportional to ns. We assume, quite realistically, that only one 
insurgent attack group participates in a given event. For example, an attack in which 10 
people were killed is necessarily due to an attack by a unit of attack strength 10. In 
particular, it could not be due to two separate but simultaneous attacks by a unit of strength 
6 and a unit of strength 4 (i.e. 6+4=10). Hence the number of events in which s people 
were killed and/or injured, is just proportional to ns. In other words, the histogram, and 
hence power-law, that we will derive for the dependence of ns on s, will also describe the 
number of events with s casualties versus s. Indeed, if we consider that an event will 
typically have a duration of T, and that there will only be a few such events in a given 
interval T, then these results should also appear similar to the distribution describing the 
number of intervals of duration T in which there were s casualties, versus s. This is indeed 
what we have found in our analysis of the empirical data.  
Given these considerations, our task of analyzing and deducing the average number 
of events with s casualties versus s over a given period of time, becomes equivalent to the 
task of analyzing and deducing the average number ns of attack units of a given attack 
strength s in that same period of time. This is what we will now calculate. We will start by 
considering a mechanism for coalescence and fragmentation of attack groups, before then 
finally deducing analytically the corresponding power-law behaviour and hence deducing a 
power-law coefficient equal to 2.5. 
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Consider an arbitrary attack unit i  with attack strength si. At any one instant in time, 
labelled t , we assume that this attack unit may either: 
a) fragment (i.e. break up) into si attack units of attack strength equal to 1. This 
feature aims to mimic an insurgent group which decides, either voluntarily or 
involuntarily, to split itself up (e.g. in order to reduce the chance of being 
captured and/or to mislead the enemy).  
b) coalesce (i.e. combine) with another attack unit j  of attack strength s j , hence 
forming a single attack unit of attack strength si + s j . This feature mimics two 
insurgent groups finding each other by chance (e.g. in the Colombian jungle) 
or deciding via radio communication to meet up and join forces.  
To implement this fragmentation/coalescence process at a given timestep, we choose an 
attack unit i  at random but with a probability which is proportional to its attack strength si . 
With a probability ν , this attack unit i  with attack strength si  fragments into si  attack units 
with attack strength 1. A justification for choosing attack unit i  with a probability which is 
proportional to its attack strength, is as follows: attack units with higher attack strength are 
likely to be bigger and hence will either run across the enemy more and/or be more actively 
sought by the enemy. By contrast, with a probability 1−ν( ) , the chosen attack unit i  
instead coalesces with another attack unit j  which is chosen at random, but again with a 
probability which is proportional to its attack strength s j . The two attack units of attack 
strengths si  and sj  then combine to form a bigger attack unit of attack strength si + s j . The 
justification for choosing attack unit j  for coalescence with a probability which is 
proportional to its attack strength, is as follows: it is presumably risky to combine attack 
units, since it must involve at least one message passing between the two units in order to 
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coordinate their actions. Hence it becomes increasingly less worthwhile to combine attack 
units as the attack units get smaller.  
This model is thus characterized by a single parameter ν . The set up of the model is 
shown schematically in the figure at the front of this Supplementary Information section, 
and in Figure 3 of the paper. The connectivity among the attack units is driven by the 
dynamics of the model. For very small ν  (i.e. much less than 1), the attack units steadily 
coalesce. This leads to the formation of large attack units. In the other limit of ν → 1, the 
system consists of many attack units with attack strength close to 1. A value of ν = 0.01 
corresponds to about one fragmentation in every 100 iterations. In what follows, we assume 
that ν  is small since the process of fragmentation should not be very frequent for any 
insurgent force which is managing to sustain an ongoing war. Indeed if such fragmentation 
were very frequent, then this would imply that the insurgents were being so pressured by 
the incumbent force that they had to fragment at nearly every timestep. Hence that 
particular war would not last very long. It turns out that infrequent fragmentations are 
sufficient to yield a steady-state process, and will also yield the power-law behaviour which 
we observe for Colombia and Iraq.  
A typical result obtained from numerical simulations, for the distribution of ns versus 
attack strength s in the long-time limit (i.e. steady-state), is shown below in terms of ns n1 :  
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Supplementary Figure 1:  Log-log plot of the number of attack units with attack 
strength s, versus attack strength s. Here N =10,000 and ν = 0.01. The results are 
obtained from a numerical simulation of the model. The initial conditions of this 
numerical simulation are such that all attack units have size 1. As time evolves, 
these attack units undergo coalescence and fragmentation as described in the text. 
In the long-time limit, the system reaches a steady state with a power-law 
dependence as shown in the figure, and with an associated power-law coefficient 
of 2.5 (i.e. 5/2). The deviation from power-law behaviour at large s is simply due to 
the finite value of N: since there can be no attack unit with an attack strength 
greater than N, the finite size of N distorts the power-law as s approaches N. 
 
We now provide an analytic derivation of the observed power-law behaviour, and 
specifically the power-law coefficient 2.5, in the steady-state (i.e. long-time) limit. 
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One could write a dynamical equation for the evolution of the model with different 
levels of approximation. For example, one could start with a microscopic description of the 
system by noting that at any moment in time, the entire insurgent army can be described by 
a partition   l1,l2,K, lN{ } of the total attack strength N  into N  attack units. Here ls is the 
number of attack units of attack strength s. For example  0,0,K,1{ } corresponds to the 
extreme coalescence case in which all the attack strength is concentrated in one big attack 
unit. By contrast,   N,0,K,0{ } corresponds to the case of extreme fragmentation in which all 
the attack units have attack strength of 1 (i.e. there are N  attack units of attack strength 1). 
Clearly, the total amount of attack strength is conserved ili
i=1
N∑  =  N .  All that happens is 
that the way in which this total attack strength N is partitioned will change in time.  
In principle, the dynamics could be described by the time-evolution of the probability 
function   p l1,l2,K, lN[ ]: in particular, taking the continuous-time limit would yield an 
equation for   dp l1, l2,K,lN[ ] dt  in terms of transitions between partitions. For example, the 
fragmentation of an attack unit of attack strength s leads to a transition from the partition 
  l1,K, ls,K, lN{ } to the partition   l1 + s,K, ls −1,K, lN{ }. For our purposes, however, it is more 
convenient to work with the average number ns  of attack units of attack strength s, which 
can be written as 
  
ns =  p
l1,...,lN{ }
∑ [l1,...,ls,K,lN ] ⋅ ls . The sum is over all possible partitions. 
Since   p l1,K, lN[ ] evolves in time, so does ns t[ ]. After the transients have died away, the 
system is expected to reach a steady-state in which  p l1,K, lN[ ] and ns t[ ] become time-
independent. The time-evolution of ns t[ ] can be written down either by intuition, or by 
invoking a mean-field approximation to the equation for  dp l1, l2,K,lN[ ] dt . Taking the 
intuitive route, one can immediately write down the following dynamical equations in the 
continuous-time limit: 
∂ns
∂t = −
ν sns
N
+ 1− ν( )
N 2
s'ns' s − s'( )ns− s' − 2 1−ν( )snsN 2 s'ns's'=1
∞∑
s'=1
s−1∑       for s ≥ 2         (0.1) 
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∂n1
∂t =
ν
N s'( )
2 ns'
s'=2
∞∑ − 2 1− ν( )n1N 2 s'ns's'=1
∞∑   (0.2) 
The terms on the right-hand side of Equation (0.1) represent all the ways in which ns can 
change. The first term represents a decrease in ns  due to the fragmentation of an attack unit 
of attack strength s: this happens only if an attack unit of attack strength s is chosen and if 
fragmentation then follows. The former occurs with probability sns N  (see earlier 
discussion) and the latter with probability ν . The second term represents an increase in ns  
as a result of the merging of an attack unit of attack strength s'  with an attack unit of attack 
strength s − s'( ). The third term describes the decrease in ns  due to the merging of an attack 
unit of attack strength s with any other attack unit. For the s =1 case described by Equation 
(0.2), the chosen attack unit remains isolated; thus Equation (0.2) does not have a 
contribution like the first term of Equation (0.1). The first term which appears in Equation 
(0.2) reflects the increase in the number of attack units of attack strength equal to 1, due to 
fragmentation of an attack unit. Similarly to Equation (0.1), the last term of Equation (0.2) 
describes the merging of an attack unit with attack strength 1, with an attack unit of any 
other attack strength. Equations (0.1) and (0.2) are so-called ‘master equations’ describing 
the dynamics within the model. Note that for simplicity, we are only considering 
fragmentation into attack units of attack strength 1. However this could be generalized – 
indeed, we will look at more general fragmentations in future publications. 
In the long-time steady state limit, Equations (0.1) and (0.2) yield:  
 sns = 1− ν( )2 − ν( )N s'ns' s− s'( )ns− s's'=1
s−1∑      for s ≥ 2 (0.3) 
 n1 = ν2 −ν( )N s'( )
2 ns'
s'= 2
∞∑  (0.4) 
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Equations of this type are most conveniently treated using the general technique of 
‘generating functions’. As the name suggests, these are functions which can be used to 
generate a range of useful quantities. Consider 
 G y[ ]= s' ns' y s'
s'= 0
∞∑  (0.5) 
where y = e−ω  is a parameter. Note that sns N  is the probability of finding an attack unit 
of attack strength s. If G y[ ] is known, sns is then formally given by  
 sns = 1s!G
(s) 0[ ] (0.6) 
where G(s) y[ ] is the s-th derivative of G y[ ]with respect to y . G(s) y[ ] can be decomposed 
as  
 G y[ ]= n1 y + s'ns'
s'= 2
∞∑ y s' ≡ n1 y + g y[ ] (0.7) 
where the function g y[ ] governs the attack-units’ attack-strength distribution ns  for s ≥ 2. 
The next task is to obtain an equation for g y[ ]. This can be done in two ways. One could 
either write down the terms in g y[ ]( )2  explicitly and then make use of Equation (0.3), or 
one could construct g y[ ] by multiplying Equation (0.3) by e−ωs  and then summing over s. 
The resulting equation is: 
 g y[ ]( )2 − 2 −ν
1−ν N − 2n1 y
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎞ 
⎠ g y[ ]+ n12 y 2 = 0  (0.8) 
First we solve for n1. From Equation (0.7), g 1[ ]= G 1[ ]− n1 = N − n1. Substituting 
n1 = N − g 1[ ] into Equation (0.8) and setting y = 1, yields  
 g 1[ ]= 1− ν
2 − ν N  (0.9) 
Hence      n1 = N − g 1[ ]= 12 − ν N          (0.10) 
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To obtain ns  with s ≥ 2, we need to solve for g y[ ]. Substituting Equation (0.10) for n1, 
Equation (0.8) becomes  
 g y[ ]( )2 − 2 −ν
1−ν N −
2N
2 − ν y
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎞ 
⎠ g y[ ]+ N
2
2 −ν( )2 y
2 = 0  (0.11) 
Equation (0.11) is a quadratic equation for g y[ ] which can be solved to obtain 
 
g y[ ]= 2 − ν( )N
4 1−ν( ) 1− 1−
4 1− ν( )
2 − ν( )2 y
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
2
= 2 − ν( )N
4 1−ν( ) 2 −
4 1−ν( )
2 − ν( )2 y − 2 1−
4 1− ν( )
2 − ν( )2 y
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ .
 (0.12) 
Using the expansionvi  
 1− x( )1 2 =1− 1
2
x − (2k − 3)!!
(2k)!!k = 2
∞∑ x k ,  (0.13) 
we have  
 g y[ ]= 2 − ν( )N
2 1− ν( )
2k − 3( )!!
2k( )!!k =2
∞∑ 4 1−ν( )2 −ν( )2 y
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
k
. (0.14) 
Comparing the coefficients in Equation (0.14) with the definition of g y[ ] in Equation (0.7), 
the probability of finding an attack unit of attack strength s is given by: 
 
sns
N
= 2 − ν( )
2 1− ν( )
2s − 3( )!!
2s( )!!
4 1−ν( )
2 −ν( )2
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
s
. (0.15) 
It hence follows that the average number of attack units of attack strength s is  
                                                 
vi The ‘double factorial’ operator !! denotes the product: ( )( )!! 2 4n n n n= − − K  
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ns = 2 − ν( )2 1− ν( )
2s − 3( )!!
s 2s( )!!
4 1−ν( )
2 −ν( )2
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
s
N
= 1− ν( )
s−1 2s − 2( )!
2 − ν( )2s−1 s!( )2 N
 (0.16) 
The s-dependence of ns  is implicit in Equation (0.16), with the dominant dependence 
arising from the factorials. Recall Stirling’s series for ln s![ ]: 
 
 
ln s![ ]= 1
2
ln 2π[ ]+ s + 1
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎞ 
⎠ ln s[ ]− s + 112s −L . (0.17) 
Retaining the few terms shown in Equation (0.17) is in fact a very good approximation, 
giving an error of < 0.05% for s ≥ 2. This motivates us to take the logarithm of both sides 
of Equation (0.16) and then apply Stirling’s formula to each log-factorial term, as in 
Equation (0.17). We follow these mathematical steps (which were derived in the M.Phil. 
thesis of Larry Yip, Chinese University of Hong King, who was supervised by Prof. Pak 
Ming Hui). We hence obtain 
ln ns( ) ≈ ln 1−ν( )
s−1
2 −ν( )2s−1 N
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ + 2s −
3
2
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ ln 2s − 2( )+ ln e2( )− 12 ln 2π( )− 2s +1( )ln s( )
≈ ln e
2 4 s 1−ν( )s−1
2
3
2 2π 2 −ν( )2s−1 N
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ + 2s −
3
2
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ ln s( )- 3s -
3
2
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
1
s
− 2s +1( )ln s( )
 
Combining the terms on the right-hand side into a single logarithm, it follows that  
 ns ≈ 2 −ν( )e
2
23/ 2 2π 1−ν( )
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
4 1−ν( )
2 −ν( )2
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
s
⋅ s −1( )
2s− 3 2
s2s+1
N . (0.18) 
The s-dependence at large s can then be deduced from Equation (0.18): 
 
  
ns N
4 1−ν( )
2 −ν( )2
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
s
s−5/2 . (0.19) ~ 
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For small values of ν , the dominant dependence on s is therefore 
 ns ~ s
−5 2 hence ns ~ s
−2.5 (0.20) 
 
We have therefore shown analytically that the distribution of attack strengths will follow a 
power-law with a coefficient 2.5 (i.e. 5/2). As discussed earlier, we assume that any 
particular attack unit could be involved in an event in a given time interval, with a 
probability p which is independent of its attack size. Hence these power-law results which 
we have derived for the distribution of attack strengths, will also apply to the distribution of 
attacks of severity x. (Recall that the attack strength s is a measure of the number of 
casualties in a typical event, and that the severity x of an event is measured as the number 
of casualties). In other words, the same power-law exponent 2.5 derived in Eq. (0.20), will 
also apply to the distribution of attacks having severity x.  
Hence our model predicts that any guerilla-like war which is characterized by an 
ongoing process of coalescence and fragmentation of attack units, and hence an 
ongoing re-distribution of the total attack strength, will have the following properties:  
(i) The distribution of events with severity x will follow a power-law. This finding is 
consistent with the behaviour observed for the aggregated data in the Iraq and 
Colombia wars (see Figure 1 of the paper). 
(ii) The power-law distribution will, in the steady-state (i.e. long-time) limit, have a 
coefficient of 2.5. This is precisely the value to which the results for Colombia and 
Iraq currently seem to be heading (see Figure 2 of the paper). 
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In the case of the Iraq war, we can go one step further by providing a simple 
generalization of the above model in order to offer an explanation for the evolution of the 
power-law coefficient throughout the war’s entire history (recall Figure 2 of paper). The 
above model is characterized by the probability ν  together with the mechanism for attack-
unit coagulation and fragmentation. This value ν  was chosen to be independent of the 
attack strength of the individual attack units involved. In this modification, we will keep the 
essential structure of the model, but we will add the modification that an attack unit will 
fragment with a probability which depends on its attack strength, and will coalesce with 
another attack unit with a probability depending on the attack strengths of the two attack 
units involved. With probability ν  the randomly-chosen attack unit i  (chosen with 
probability proportional to the attack strength) will fragment into attack units of attack 
strength 1, with a probability f si[ ] which depends on si . With probability (1−ν)  the attack 
unit of attack strength si  coalesces with another randomly-chosen attack unit j  having 
attack strength sj , with probability f si[ ]f sj[ ]. They remain separated otherwise. With the 
choice f s[ ]=1 the original model is recovered. Analytically, this particular formulation of 
the fragmentation and coagulation process can be readily treated by the generating function 
approach discussed earlier, as will be demonstrated below. 
Before proceeding, we discuss why this probabilistic ‘attack-unit-formation’ process 
may indeed mimic certain aspects of guerilla warfare. One such aspect is the effect of the 
arrival of opposing troops in the area. Imagine that at a given timestep and with a given 
probability ν , the opposing army arrives in the vicinity of a given attack unit of attack 
strength si . If the overall conflict is such that the opposing army has the 
guerrillas/insurgents on the run, then this might suggest to the members of the insurgent 
attack unit that they should separate and move away from the area. However, if the state of 
the conflict is such that the guerilla/insurgent force feels powerful, they are unlikely to just 
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disband and run if they have a significant attack strength. Instead they will possibly stand 
their ground and fight. Hence their probability of fragmentation is likely to be a decreasing 
function of their attack strength. By contrast, with probability 1−ν( ) , no opposing troops 
arrive in the vicinity of the attack unit. With probability f si[ ] ( f s j[ ]) the attack unit i  ( j ) 
decide to join forces. Thus, the two attack units will coalesce with probability f si[ ] f sj[ ]. 
Again, this need for coalescing is likely to be less if the two attack units involved already 
feel powerful. Hence we would expect the probability of coalescence of the two attack units 
to be a decreasing function of their attack strengths. It is therefore quite plausible that -- 
depending on the state of the war from the insurgent force’s perspective -- the probabilities 
of fragmentation and coalescence should depend on f si[ ] ( f s j[ ]), i.e. they depend on the 
attack strengths of the attack units involved. 
Analytically, the master equations for the specific example case in which f s[ ] ~ s−δ  
can readily be written down: 
 ∂ns∂t = −
ν s1−δ ns
N
+ 1− ν( )
N 2
s'( )1−δ ns' (s− s')1−δ ns− s' − 2 1−ν( )s
1−δ ns
N 2
s'( )1−δ ns'
s'=1
∞∑
s'=1
s−1∑   for s ≥ 2  (0.21) 
 
∂n1
∂t =
ν
N s'( )
2−δ ns' − 2 1−ν( )n1N 2 s'( )
1−δ ns'
s'=1
∞∑
s'=2
∞∑   (0.22) 
with the physical meaning of each term being similar to that for Equations (0.1) and (0.2). 
The steady state equations become  
 s1−δ ns = A s'( )1−δ ns' (s − s')1−δ ns−s'
s'=1
s−1∑  (0.23) 
 n1 = B s'( )2−δ
s'= 2
∞∑ ns'  (0.24) 
The constant coefficients A and B are given by  
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A = 1−ν
N ν + 2 1− ν( ) s'( )1−δ ns's'=1∞∑      and     B =
N ν
2 1− ν( ) s'( )1−δ ns's'=1∞∑  
Setting δ = 0 in Equations (0.23) and (0.24) recovers Equations (0.3) and (0.4) for the 
original model. A generating function  
 G y[ ]= s'( )1−δ
s'= 0
∞∑ ns' ys' = n1 y + g y[ ] (0.25) 
can be introduced where g y[ ]= s'( )1−δ ns's'=2∞∑ y s' and y = e−ω . The function g y[ ] satisfies a 
quadratic equation of the form  
 g y[ ]( )2 − 1
A
− 2n1 y⎛ ⎝ 
⎞ 
⎠ g y[ ]+ n12 y 2 = 0  (0.26) 
which is a generalization of Equation (0.8). Using n1 + g 1[ ]= s'( )1−δs'=1∞∑ ns'  and Equation 
(0.26), n1can be obtained as  
 n1 = 1−ν( )
2 − ν2 A2 N 2
4 1−ν( )2 A  (0.27) 
Solving Equation (0.26) for g y[ ]gives  
 g y[ ]= 1
4A
1− 1− 4n1 A y( )2  (0.28) 
Following the steps leading to Equation (0.19), we obtain ns in the modified model: 
 
  
ns N
4 1−ν( ) 1− ν( )+ N ν
s'( )1−δ ns's'=1∞∑
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ ⎟ 
N ν
s'( )1−δ ns's'=1∞∑ + 2 1−ν( )
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ 
s
s−(5/2−δ ) (0.29) 
For δ = 0, s'( )1−δ
s'=1
∞∑ ns' = N  and hence Equation (0.29) reduces to the result in Equation 
(0.19) for the original model. Forδ ≠ 0, it is difficult to solve explicitly for ns . However the 
~ 
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summation simply gives a constant, and thus for small ν  the dominant dependence on the 
attack strength s is ns ~ s
− 5 2−δ( ) and hence equivalently ns ~ s− 2.5−δ( ).   
Most importantly, we can see that by decreasing δ  from 0.7 → 0 (i.e. by 
increasing the relative fragmentation/coalescence rates of larger attack units) we span 
the entire spectrum of power-law exponents observed in the Iraq war from the initial 
value of 1.8, up to the current tendency towards 2.5. This effect of decreasing δ  from 
0.7 → 0  corresponds in our model to a relative increase in the tendency for larger 
attack units to either fragment or coalesce at each timestep. In other words, 
decreasing δ  mimics the effect of decreasing the relative robustness or ‘lifetime’ of 
larger attack units.  
Going further, we note that these theoretical results are consistent with, and to some 
extent explain, the various power-law exponents found for: 
(1) Conventional wars. The corresponding power-law exponent 1.8 can now be interpreted 
through our generalized model with δ ≈ 0.7, as a tendency toward building larger, robust 
attack units with a fixed attack strength as in a conventional army -- as opposed to attack 
units with rapidly fluctuating attack strengths as a result of frequent fragmentation and 
coalescence processes. There is also a tendency to form a distribution of attack units with a 
wide spectrum of attack strengths – this is again consistent with the composition of 
‘conventional’ armies from the past. 
(2) Terrorism in G7 countries. The corresponding power-law exponent 1.7 can be 
interpreted through our generalized model with δ ≈ 0.8, as an even stronger tendency for 
robust units (e.g. terrorist cells) to form. There is also an increased tendency to form larger 
units – or rather, to operate as part of a large organization. 
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(3) Terrorism in non-G7 countries. The corresponding power-law exponent 2.5 can be 
interpreted through our model with δ = 0, as a tendency toward more transient attack units 
(e.g. terrorist cells) whose attack strengths are continually evolving dynamically as a result 
of an on-going fragmentation and coalescence process. Unlike a conventional army, there 
will be a tendency to form smaller attack units rather than larger ones. 
 
Interestingly, we can now discuss the evolution of the wars in Colombia and Iraq in these 
terms: 
War in Colombia. At the beginning of the 1990’s, the power-law exponent was very high 
(3.5). Then over the following 15 years, it gradually lowered to the present value and 
appears to be tending toward 2.5. Using our model, the interpretation is that the war at the 
beginning of the 1990’s was such that the guerrillas favoured having small attack units. 
This is possibly because they lacked communications infrastructure, and/or did not feel any 
safety in larger numbers. The decrease toward the value 2.5, suggests that this has changed 
– probably because of increased infrastructure and communications, enabling attack units 
with a wide range of attack strengths to build up. 
War in Iraq. At the beginning of the war in 2002, the power-law exponent was quite low 
(1.8) and was essentially the same value as conventional wars. This is consistent with the 
war being fought by a conventional Iraqi army against the Coalition forces. There is then a 
break in this value after a few months (i.e. the war ended) and following this, the power-
law exponent gradually rises towards 2.5. This suggests that the insurgents have been 
increasingly favouring more temporary attack units, with an increasingly rapid 
fragmentation-coalescence process. This finding could be interpreted as being a result of 
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increased success by the Coalition Forces in terms of forcing the insurgents to fragment. On 
the other hand, it also means that the Iraq War has now moved to a value, and hence 
character, which is consistent with generic non-G7 terrorism.  
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PART 2:  Supplementary tables and figures which help confirm the robustness of our 
results 
 
Estimates of power-law coefficients for the entire time-series 
 1α  Confidence 
Interval 
Percentage of 
points inside 
interval 
2α  Confidence 
Interval  
Adjusted R2 
K 3.1013 +/- 0.02 0.95% 2.8761 +/- 0.0151 0.9835 
I 3.04 +/- 0.02 0.95% 2.9717 +/- 0.0211 0.9818 
KI 2.93 +/- 0.015 0.95% 3.0061 +/- 0.0179 0.9796 
CKmin 2.07 +/- 0.005 0.90% 2.1279 +/- 0.0057 0.9336 
CKmax 2.02 +/- 0.003 0.90% 2.0966 +/- 0.0043 0.9496 
Supplementary Table 1  Shows two complementary estimates of the power-law 
coefficients for the variables K (reported deaths for Colombia), I (reported injuries 
for Colombia), KI (reported deaths plus injuries for Colombia), CKmin (minimum 
reported civilian deaths for Iraq) and CKmax (maximum reported civilian deaths for 
Iraq).  Our first estimate ( 1α ) uses  α =1+ n ln xi xmin
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
i=1
n∑⎡ ⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
−1
 while our second 
estimate ( 2α ) uses ordinary least-squares linear regression.  The two results are 
always very similar and the results vary little as we vary the victimization measure 
for Colombia. For further discussion, see PART 3 of this Supplementary 
Information document. 
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Supplementary Figure 2  The variation through time of the power law coefficients 
for three 2,500 day intervals displaced by 1,855 days for the Colombian data and 
three 365 day intervals displaced every 258 days for the Iraq data.  Despite this 
change in size of the windows and how they slide across time both curves seem to 
be tending toward 2.5, as in Figure 2 of the paper. For further discussion, see 
PART 3 of this Supplementary Information document. 
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Supplementary Figure 3  The variation through time of the power law coefficients 
for two year intervals displaced every year for Colombia and 200 day intervals 
displaced every 200 days for Iraq.  Again, they both seem to be tending toward 2.5, 
as in Figure 2 of the paper. For further discussion, see PART 3 of this 
Supplementary Information document. 
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Supplementary Figure 4   Log-Log plots of cumulative distributions )( xXP ≥   
describing events greater than x , for the minimum possible value and maximum 
possible value of each event in the Iraq dataset.  The results are very much the 
same across the two measures. For further discussion, see PART 3 of this 
Supplementary Information document. 
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PART 3:  Supplementary Notes on Methods 
If α−= Cxxp )( , then, )1(min)1( −−= αα xC  and α =1+ n ln xixmin
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ i=1
n∑⎡ ⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
−1
.  
We used two estimates for α  (see Supplementary Information Table 1 in PART 2). We 
estimated 1α  using α  with minx  equal to the minimum value that satisfies the Kolmogorov 
statistic for the whole data set.  We estimated 2α  using ordinary least-square regression 
analysis for all the values greater than minx . 
We established minx  as the minimum value of x  where we could not reject the 
hypothesis that the data beyond minx  followed a power law using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
goodness of fit test at 95% confidence. 
In order to estimate the error of α , we used a minus-one jackknife resampling 
method.  We created the datasets obtained by removing one value from the original dataset.  
For each of these surrogates, we estimated α  and C .  We then measured the maximum and 
minimum deviation from the mean of the parameters α  obtained from the diverse 
jackknife datasets. We established an interval equal to the maximum distance from the 
mean of the sample times 5.  Since this is not an analytical solution, we present the 
percentage of values that fall into that interval.  
The Evolution of α :  To test the robustness of our findings in Figure 2 of the paper, we 
have repeated the calculation of α  for several different sizes of the time windows. We also 
tried varying the way in which these windows slide forward in time.  All these changes 
barely affected our results.  
As an example, in Part 2 of this document we have plotted the evolution of KI (deaths 
and injuries) for different time windows. For the Colombian data set we used a time 
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window of 2,500 days moved every 1,855 days (see Supplementary Figure 2); then a 
moving time window of two years displaced every year (see Supplementary Figure 3), and 
finally a moving time window of two years, displaced every 50 days (Figure 1). For the 
Iraq data set we used a 365 day time window displaced every 258 days (Supplementary 
Figure 2), a 250 day interval displaced every 150 days (Supplementary Figure 3), and a 365 
day time window displaced every 30 days (Figure 1). As can be seen, our results are 
essentially unchanged by these variations. 
 
Further general comment on robustness testing:  As a further test of the robustness of 
the results obtained in our paper, and in particular our main findings in Figures 1 and 2 of 
the paper, we ran the following variations of our calculations. For Colombia we used just 
killings and just injuries, rather than killings plus injuries as presented in the paper.  For 
Iraq we used the maximum number of deaths rather than the minimum number of deaths as 
reported in the paper. These results are shown in Supplementary Figure 4. As can be seen, 
these variations do not affect our findings. This is reassuring, and is actually not too 
surprising since the power-law coefficient α  provides a statistical measure of the structure 
of the events’ time-series, rather than the absolute number of killings and/or injuries. Hence 
the power-law coefficient α  will be unaffected by any constant scale factors which are 
introduced as a result of a fixed ratio of injuries to killings.  
An additional, but perhaps even more important, advantage of focusing on α , 
concerns possible over- or under-reporting of war casualties. In particular, α  is insensitive 
to systematic over-reporting or under-reporting of casualties. This is because any 
systematic multiplication of the raw numbers by some constant factor, has no affect on the 
α  value which emerges from the log-log plot.  
